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On Judges and the Art of 
Judicature: Shakespeare’s  
Henry IV, Part 2
by Penelope Geng
In the late sixteenth century, the common law experienced a phenomenal growth, both 
in the number of practitioners and jurisdictional power. A comparison of popular and 
professional literature on legal administration or judicature reveals the complex and 
ambivalent cultural response to the “rise” of the common law. Despite the usual praise 
for the common law as that which distinguished England from France, Italy, and other 
countries using civil law, many questioned the law’s ability to deliver justice. Popular 
writing on justice, produced by preachers, moral essayists, and dramatists, centered 
on the law’s failure to protect the poor, weak, and otherwise marginalized members of 
society. While popular legal commentators lacked the power to reform legal practices, 
they attempted to shape the public’s perception of the law and lawyers through the writ-
ing of legal character. Authors of assize sermons and character books defined the char-
acter of a “good magistrate” as a “loving” father. In contrast, legal writing by lawyers 
suppressed the language of love and placed the emphasis on reason. This article investi-
gates the resulting friction between professional and popular representations of judges 
and judicature and examines its impact on Shakespearean drama. In Henry IV, Part 2, 
Shakespeare explores the dissonance and irresolution within the cultural discourse on 
legal administration, and in so doing, expresses a tragic truth about the paucity of jus-
tice in a world consumed by law.
DURING the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the English common law gained historic strength, as witnessed in the concentration of jurisdictional power in the central courts 
and in the sharp increase in civil litigation.1 Consequently, the number 
1 According to Christopher Brooks, the rate of civil litigation peaked in 1600 (“Profes-
sions, Ideology and the Middling Sort in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Cen-
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of legal officers tasked with the administration of the law grew steadily, 
as did the rate of matriculation at the Inns. According to Louis A. 
Knafla, the years 1579 to 1584 marked the first of several periods of 
“highly accelerated growth” for the Inns of Court.2 Although contem-
poraries lacked access to the numerical data of modern historians, they 
were acutely aware and deeply critical of the structural transformation 
of the law, especially with respect to the exponential growth of lawyers 
in a relatively short span of time.
A comparison of how legal professionals and nonprofessionals wit-
nessed the rise of the common law reveals starkly different worldviews. 
Lawyers took pride in the growth of their profession. “The posterity 
of Lawyers hath more flourished then that either of the Clergy or Citi-
sens,” remarked the lawyer and diarist John Manningham.3 But the 
phenomenal growth of the legal profession also provoked negative re-
sponses. Indeed, many suspected that lawyers got rich by entrapping 
their clients within law’s intricate procedures. In an unpublished 1603 
assize sermon, George Closse (a preacher from Black Torrington, De-
von) sharply criticized lawyers for their unethical practices. Closse re-
counts the following story: a man of the cloth asks a lawyer what “law 
is,” and the lawyer replies that law is “a pretty tricke to catche mony 
w[i]t[h]all.” Closse quips, “and indeed a man may beleve it to be a prin-
cipall point in the p[ro]fes sion.”4 He reminds his audience that “our 
turies,” in The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society, and Politics in England, 1550–1800, 
ed. Jonathan Barry and Christopher Brooks [Houndmills: Macmillan, 1994], 123). Addi-
tionally, J. A. Sharpe comments that “practically every court, whether civil or criminal, 
experienced an increase in business between the mid- sixteenth and mid- seventeenth cen-
turies” (“‘Such Disagreement Betwyx Neighbours’: Litigation and Human Relations in 
Early Modern England,” in Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, 
ed. John Bossy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 168).
2 Knafla, “The Matriculation Revolution and Education at the Inns of Court in Renais-
sance England,” in Tudor Men and Institutions, ed. Arthur Slavin (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1972), 237.
3 Manningham, The Diary of John Manningham of the Middle Temple, 1602–1603, ed. Rob-
ert Parker Sorlien (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1976), 78.
4 Closse, A Looking Glasse for Lawers, & Lawiers. A Sermon Preached before the Judges of 
Assize for the Countie of Devon, in the Cathedrall Church of St Peter in Exon on the 8th Day of 
August:1603: By George Closse Maister of Artes, a Preacher of the Worde of God at Blacktorring-
ton, Lambeth Palace Library MS 113, ff.53r– 60v, 57v. I am grateful to Arnold Hunt for 
bringing this manuscript to my attention. For additional examples of anti- lawyer satire in 
assize sermons, and general discussion of the evolution of the genre, see Hugh Adling-
ton, “Restoration, Religion, and Law: Assize Sermons, 1660–1685,” in The Oxford Hand-
book of the Early Modern Sermon, ed. Peter McCullough, Hugh Adlington, and Emma Rha-
tigan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 423–59; Arnold Hunt, The Art of Hearing: 
English Preachers and Their Audiences, 1590–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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lawes are not cobwebbes to catche flyes, & let great birdes breake theron 
them.”5 The image of the spider’s web, as Hugh Adlington explains in 
his study of early modern assize sermons, comes from Plutarch’s biog-
raphy of Solon, and preachers often used it “to illustrate inequitable 
judicial procedure.”6 People used the courts—and sought the counsel 
of lawyers—but they resented the experience. Not surprisingly, antipa-
thy toward the legal profession spawned numerous verse satires and 
plays.7
The explosion of anti- lawyer complaints and satires, however, did 
not signal a mass protest against the law itself.8 Rather, the complaints 
were chiefly directed against the officers of the law. Of those who took 
up the commons’ cause, preachers, essayists, and dramatists were the 
most aggressive in vocalizing the flaws of lawmen: their failure to de-
liver fair judgments, to carefully sift evidence, and to adequately pro-
tect the innocent, the poor, the weak, and the otherwise marginalized 
members of society. Although they lacked the power to reform legal 
practices, these lay legal commentators attempted to shape the pub-
lic’s perception of the law and the habits of legal professionals through 
their analysis of legal character, that is, the moral character of judges 
and other magistrates involved in “judicature,” the administration of 
the law. They reasoned that if the law was the perfection of reason and 
2010); Barbara J. Shapiro, “Political Theology and the Courts: A Survey of Assize Sermons, 
c1600–1688,” Law and Humanities 2 (2008): 1–28. On the use of assize sermons as a medium 
of political complaint and social negotiation, see Juliet Amy Ingram, “The Conscience of 
the Community: The Character and Development of Clerical Complaint in Early Modern 
England” (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2004), chap. 2.
5 Closse, A looking Glasse for lawers, & lawiers, 58r.
6 Adlington, “Restoration, Religion, and Law,” 427. Subha Mukherji examines other 
common images of law, including the image of law as a Hydra’s head, a waxen nose, 
and a labyrinth. See her Law and Representation in Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006), 233–48. Additionally, Peter Goodrich’s Legal Emblems and 
the Art of Law: Obiter Depicta as the Vision of Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2014) offers a comprehensive study (as well as illustrations) of law- related em-
blems, images, and iconography.
7 For a survey and analysis of early modern English anti- law satire, see Edward F. J. 
Tucker, Intruder into Eden: Representations of the Common Lawyer in English Literature, 1350–
1750 (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1984). On popular responses to the rise of profes-
sions (including that of law) in early modern England, see Edward Gieskes, Representing 
the Professions: Administration, Law, and Theater in Early Modern England (Newark: Univer-
sity of Delaware Press, 2006).
8 According to Sir Edward Coke, the English commonwealth owed its peace and 
stability to the rule of law. In “other Nations,” he claims, the people are oppressed by 
“tyranny” and the monarch’s “powerfull will and pleasure” (Coke, Le Second Part Des Re-
portes Del Edward Coke [London, 1602], ¶4v).
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humans (by nature) were weak and fallible, then injustice had to be the 
result of human negligence or corruption.
Lay legal commentators lacked a language to address institutional or 
systemic injustice. Injustice was attributed to human moral failings. For 
that reason, when we encounter this body of literature, we routinely 
come across such stock characters as the ignorant scrivener, the greedy 
advocate, the partial judge, and other immoral legal characters. In early 
modern England, those who had the ability to reflect and comment on 
the law (and print those comments for public consumption) defined jus-
tice as a form of moral character, of individual virtue or vice. This is a 
reading of justice that apparently resonated with popular audiences. 
Curiously, legal professionals also found uses for the paradigm. For ex-
ample, in his essay “Of Judicature,” Sir Francis Bacon complains of the 
“Unjust Judge” whose “Foule Sentence . . . Corrupteth the Fountaine” 
of justice.9 Bacon raises the specter of the partial judge in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the profession: blame the lawman, spare the law.10
As law came to occupy an ever- greater share of the cultural imagina-
tion, writers from different social and professional backgrounds made 
a concerted effort to fix the character of the judge, from his moral wis-
dom to his self- presentation.11 Yet, as I shall explain, professional and 
nonprofessional writers employed different criteria in their evaluation 
of the “good” judge. The differences expose a gap between professional 
and lay visions of the nature of law and administration. Whereas mem-
bers of the legal profession spoke reassuringly of the integrity of the law 
(even as some lawyers occasionally questioned the dominant view), the 
public and their advocates, the writers who echoed and amplified pub-
9 Bacon, The Essayes or Coundels, Civill and Morall, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford: Claren-
don, 2000), 166. My discussion of judicial character writing connects in some ways to 
Holger Schott Syme’s recent article published in this journal on the depiction of juries 
in early modern drama. Syme argues that “early modern notions of justice tended to be 
strongly linked to procedural ideals, casting the state rather than the individual as the 
guarantor of just order” (“(Mis)representing Justice on the Early Modern Stage,” Studies 
in Philology 109 [2012]: 64). I hope that my article shows how early modern writers valued 
individuals’ contribution to the “just order” as much as trial by jury.
10 Ironically, years later, Bacon himself would be indicted for taking bribes whilst 
serving as the Lord Chancellor and judge of the Chancery court.
11 An early but seminal text within this genre is A Mirror for Magistrates (written some-
time in the 1550s). See Scott C. Lucas, A Mirror for Magistrates and the Politics of the English 
Reformation (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009); Jessica Winston, “A Mir-
ror for Magistrates and Public Political Discourse in Elizabethan England,” Studies in Phi-
lology 104 (2004): 381–400; and Paul Budra, A Mirror for Magistrates and the De Casibus Tra-
dition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
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lic opinion, bitterly complained of the law’s inability to distribute fair 
and equitable justice because of an overly complex and mediated legal 
system.12
What did the critics say about “good” judges? Preachers exhorted 
magistrates to be “loving” fathers to the people and to practice mercy in 
judgment. A judge should respond to petitioners with immediate atten-
tion, sympathy, and understanding. Hence, addressing an imaginary 
judge, the preacher Robert Harris emphasizes that “you are tearmed 
Fathers: direct you must, correct you may, but all in love.”13 Cast in the 
role of the loving father, the judge works to preserve a sense of fellow-
ship and belonging in the Christian community. What was the profes-
sionals’ response? Lawyers emphasized the role of reason, knowledge, 
and Stoic disavowal of the passions in the act of judgment. The word 
“love” rarely appears in the professional’s vocabulary. Indeed, lawyers 
associated that word with judicial corruption and partiality.14 When 
judges and lawyers reflected on the duties of their office, they empha-
sized the intellectual demands of their work: reading, pleading, and 
commentary. Addressing different audiences, citing different authori-
ties, professional and nonprofessional writers applied seemingly in-
commensurate formulas in their evaluation of the person of the magis-
12 The phenomenon of mediation in law is richly explored in Holger Schott Syme, 
Theatre and Testimony in Shakespeare’s England: A Culture of Mediation (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012). Occasionally, lawyers acknowledged the complaints of the 
people. For example, in his legal treatise Archeion, or Commentaries on the Courts of England 
(composed in 1591, possibly began earlier, and published in 1635), Sir William Lambarde 
(a lawyer, justice of the peace, and member of Parliament) raises the possibility of judi-
cial corruption in Elizabethan courts. The Harvard Law School Library possesses a rare 
manuscript copy of Lambarde’s book under the title of “Against Auricular Information of 
Judges: 1590: W. La.” When Wilfrid Prest compared the manuscript to the printed copy, 
he discovered that the manuscript copy “lists some of the more subtle ways in which a 
case law can be prejudiced: ‘by resuming it to a private hearing, by drawing it into Long 
and tedious prosequution, by commiting it to a partial reaporte, by referring it to some 
Unequal arbitrement’” (“William Lambarde, Elizabethan Law Reform, and Early Stuart 
Politics,” Journal of British Studies 34 [1995]: 471–72). Lambarde’s analysis of judicial cor-
ruption is vaguely expressed. Throughout his critique, Lambarde carefully omits details 
that could connect his observations to a specific place, time, or person.
13 Harris, Saint Paul’s Exercise. A Sermon Preached before the Judges at Assize, in Two Ser-
mons: The One Preached before the Judges of Assize at Oxford. The Other to the Universities (Lon-
don, 1628), D4r.
14 For a recent analysis of legal professional and dramatic representations of judicial 
partiality, see Derek Dunne, “‘Partialitie in a Judge, Is a Turpitude’: Partial Judges and 
Impartial Revengers in Early Modern English Drama,” in The Emergence of Impartiality: 
Towards a History of Objectivity, ed. Kathryn Murphy and Anita Traninger (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 171–89.
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trate. In describing the judge—his person (in the sense of character) and 
his relationships with the people he judges—nonprofessional writers 
effectively trespassed on the legal field, at times contesting the profes-
sionals’ vision with their popular notions of justice.15
This article traces the key differences between professional and 
popular representations of judges and legal administration. In the first 
section, I examine assize sermons and character books published be-
tween the 1590s and 1620s to show how they employ the language of 
love and construct the fantasy of direct contact in law. In the second 
section, I explore the conspicuous absence of both the language of love 
and the narrative of direct legal contact in the professional literature. 
On the whole, lawyers and judges emphasized the necessity of emo-
tional and physical distance in law. Then, in the third section, I study 
the impact of this rich debate on Shakespearean drama. In Henry IV, 
Part 2, the gradual transformation of the Lord Chief Justice—a charac-
ter loosely based on the historic figure Sir William Gascoigne (c. 1350–
1419)—from a local mediator, a pseudo- justice of the peace who rubs 
shoulders with the people in the marketplace, to a royal justice who 
stands literally and metaphorically between the king and his subjects, 
captures the dissonance and irresolution within the cultural discourse 
on legal administration, and in so doing, expresses a tragic truth about 
the paucity of justice in a world consumed by law.16 By emphasizing 
15 Although I posit a difference between popular and professional views on judges 
and justice, I am not proposing that the writers themselves were strictly divided accord-
ing to professional lines. Indeed, as recent work in both literature and history has shown, 
the categories of the “professional” and “nonprofessional” were often blurred. Some legal 
practitioners were nonprofessionals, in the sense of their lacking legal education and ex-
pertise, and some lawyers were far more interested in popular and literary writing than 
the law. Nonetheless, I argue that popular and professional writers were conditioned to 
talk about the person of the judge using different languages, and that these differences 
flow from the process of professionalization that accelerated during the reign of Eliza-
beth. For further discussion of the integration of literature and art at the Inns of Court, 
see Jessica Winston, Lawyers at Play: Literature, Law and Politics at the Early Modern Inns of 
Court, 1558–1581 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; Jane Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth 
Goldring, and Sarah Knight, eds., The Intellectual and Cultural World of the Early Modern 
Inns of Court (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); Michelle O’Callaghan, The 
English Wits: Literature and Sociability in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
16 Sir William Gascoigne (c. 1350–1419) lived six years into the reign of Henry V. Born 
in Gawthorpe, Yorkshire, Gascoigne graduated from Cambridge and later of the Inner 
Temple and enjoyed a respectable career from the time he was appointed to the bench (15 
Nov. 1400) to the time of Henry IV’s death. Henry V paid the justice due respect by re-
warding him “‘four bucks and does out of the Forest of Pontefract annually for the term 
of his natural life’” (F. Solly- Flood, “The Story of Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief- 
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the contradictions embodied in the character, I hope to revise a now- 
standard interpretation that considers the Chief Justice as an emblem of 
the law: a “symbol, not man.”17 I argue that such identification is based 
on the assumption that the character embodies a coherent vision of law, 
a vision found in common law treatises written by legal professionals. 
But this is not the case. The Chief Justice exemplifies the excesses and 
contradictions found in both popular and professional legal ideology. 
Like the idealized magistrates in popular and moral- legal writing, the 
Chief Justice establishes a paternal relationship with petitioners. He dis-
penses ad hoc justice without middlemen or documentation. Yet his per-
sonal, intimate style of justice proves to be ineffective. Although he pro-
vides sage advice and equitable sentences, the Chief Justice ultimately 
leaves the community in a lurch: without adequate protection or legal 
recourse against injustice. Yet even as the play dashes the popular dis-
course and its insistence on popular contact, it casts doubt on the pro-
fessional account of effective legal administration as the maintenance 
of distance, both emotional and physical, between the judge and the 
people. In the final scenes, the Chief Justice mirrors the remote maj-
esty of the king and participates in Hal’s rejection of Falstaff. The tragic 
mood in the final scene exposes a paradox in law: by implementing the 
king’s mandate, the judge effectively bars any further possibility of for-
giveness or reconciliation between Hal and Falstaff. The action of the 
character casts doubt on the capacity of law to administer justice—not 
the justice as defined by the monarch or the institution of law but the 
justice alive in the popular imagination—a justice that transforms dis-
cord into harmony through a magistrate’s direct and loving care.
JUDGES IN THE POPULAR IMAGINATION
In England, there were opportunities, albeit limited, for face- to- face en-
counters between judges and petitioners. For example, people could—
and did—plead before judges in prerogative courts such as the Court 
Justice Gascoign,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, n.s., 3 [1886]: 65). See also 
Edward Powell, “Gascoigne, Sir William (c. 1350–1419),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biog-
raphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article 
/10427.
17 M. C. Bradbrook, Shakespeare and Elizabethan Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1951), 201. See also her essay “Role- Playing in Henry IV,” in William Shake-
speare’s Henry IV, Part 2, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), 
71–83.
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of Requests and Star Chamber. Both courts attracted relatively humble 
petitioners.18 On rare occasions, petitioners appeared before judges in 
domestic spaces. For example, John Levermore, an Exeter trader, man-
aged to take his case to Sir John Popham (who was then the Lord Chief 
Justice) while the latter sat at dinner with a friend.19 But stories like 
Levermore’s survive, in part, because of their exceptional nature. What 
people expected and what they got for the most part were law’s delays.
The exploitative nature of lawyers is diagnosed and analyzed in 
assize sermons and character books, which were published, beginning 
in the late sixteenth century, in small volumes for a general audience. 
In this literature, lawyers appear as trickster figures who bedevil their 
clients with legal legerdemain. The conclusion is clear: justice may pre-
vail only in the absence of such slippery intermediaries. In his assize 
sermon, Closse sketches a tragic- comic portrait of a man enmeshed in 
law’s labyrinth. He “counteth his care, his cost, his labor, his time & 
every thing” and “lamentes he bought so deere inke & paper; so many 
narrow sheetes written w[i]t[h] so few & short lines.”20 For the poor 
man to receive justice, he must enjoy direct contact with a judge, or so 
preachers and other moral writers reasoned.
Preachers and moral writers combed the Bible for examples of di-
rect contact in law, and they found their exemplars in David, Solo mon, 
Josiah, and Hezekiah, and other judges of the Old Testament.21 For ex-
ample, the popular London preacher Henry Smith, whose sermons saw 
multiple printings in the 1590s, describes how David praised Jerusalem 
for establishing a “seate for judgment set in the gate, wher through men 
might have passage to and from the judgement seat.”22 Samuel Garey, 
another preacher, reminds his readers that the biblical Samuel traveled 
“about yeare by yeare, (as it were in circuite) to Bethel, Gilgal, and Miz-
18 On the day- to- day operation of the Star Chamber, see Steve Hindle, The State and 
Social Change in Early Modern England, 1550–1640 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002) and of 
the Court of Requests, particularly as it was used by female litigants, see Timothy Stret-
ton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998).
19 Popham was Chief Justice between 1592 and 1607. See Douglas Walthew Rice, The 
Life and Achievements of Sir John Popham, 1531–1607: Leading to the Establishment of the First 
English Colony in New England (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005), 
102–3.
20 Closse, A Looking Glasse, 60r.
21 The acts of Lycurgus and Solon were translated by Thomas North in Plutarch, The 
Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes (London, 1595).
22 Smith, A Memento for Magistrates, in The Poore-Mans Teares (London, 1592), E[8]r.
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peth, and judged Israel in all those places.”23 John Stephens, in his char-
acter book, remarks that the “Honest Lawyer” is defined by his ability 
to “ride the circuit, and scorne to be circular.”24 Along similar lines, 
Joseph Hall, in his character book, states that the “good magistrate” 
“knows himself made for a public servant of peace and justice” and that 
as a “public servant,” he willingly allows his “meals” to be “short and 
interrupted.”25 For these writers, the chief value of direct contact is the 
preservation of unmediated truth. By hearing the facts of the case from 
the people themselves, judges are able to deliver just decisions.
The notion of direct contact sustains the common vision, found in 
assize sermons and like works, that sees the magistrate as a “father of 
the people.”26 Comparisons of judges to fathers, indeed, loving fathers, 
distinguish the popular discourse from the professional one. (The next 
section will discuss the professional outlook in detail.) Thus, the afore-
mentioned preacher Garey states that “[t]he poore commit themselves 
unto you [judges], for you should be helpers of the fatherlesse” and 
“relieve the oppressed . . . & defend the widowes.”27 In the margin, 
Garey (or his printer) added a biblical citation to “Psal. 10. 13.”28 The 
preacher Robert Harris reasons that a good magistrate acts as a poor 
man’s “brother.” He states that the “office” of the “Reverend Judges” is 
to “plucke the spoile out of the teeth of the mighty, as Job did; and to be-
stride your poore brother, when hee is stricken downe.”29 Like Garey, 
Har ris is careful to ground his exegesis in the scripture, specifically in 
23 Garey, Ientaculum Iudicum: Or, A Breake- Fast for the Bench: Prepared, Presented, and 
Preached in Two Sacred Seruices, or Sermons, the Morning Sacrifice before the Two Assizes: 
At Thetford, at Norwich: 1619. Containing Monitory Meditations, to Execute Iustice and Law- 
Businesse with a Good Conscience (London, 1623), B3r.
24 Stephens, Essayes and Characters, Ironicall, and Instructive, in Books of Characters, Illus-
trating the Habits and Manners of Englishmen from the Reign of James I. to the Restoration, ed. 
James O. Halliwell (London, 1857), 149. Stephens’s book was first published in 1615.
25 Hall, Characters of Vertues and Vices. In Two Bookes (London, 1608), E[5]v. Hall copies 
this sentence (nearly verbatim) from Pierre de Charron’s De la sagesse (On Wisdom). In the 
French edition, Charron writes, “Le Magistrat doibt estre de facile acces, prest a ouyr & 
entendre toutes plaintes & requestes, tenant sa porte ouuerte a tous, & ne s’absenter point, 
se souuenant qu’il n’est à foy, mais à tous; & serviteur du public” (De la Sagesse [Paris, 
1607], 685).
26 Sir Christopher(?) Yelverton, “Notes of Sermons, 1592–1621,” BL, Add. MS 48016, 
31r.
27 Garey, Ientaculum Iudicum, B[4]r– v, D2r.
28 Psalms 10: 14: “the poore committeth himselfe unto thee, thou art the helper of the 
fatherlesse” (The Holy Bible [London, 1611], 3B6r, http://sceti.library.upenn.edu/sceti/printed 
booksNew/index.cfm?TextID=kjbible&PagePosition=651).
29 Harris, Saint Paul’s Exercise, D2v.
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Job 29: 14–17, “I put on righteousness as my clothing: justice was my 
robe and my turban. I was eyes to the blind, and feet to the lame. I was 
a father to the needy; I took up the teeth.”30 Through their choice selec-
tion of quotations from the Bible, preachers built their idealized image 
of the judge as a loving father.
Although preachers advocated a program of love in law, they were 
also sensitive to the all- too- easy slippage between affection and favorit-
ism. Thus, Harris reminds judges that to be moved to “smite a sinner, 
with a weeping eie and a feeling heart” is not the same thing as to be 
overcome by emotions.31 “Passion and unruly affections” have no place 
in the law.32 Few navigated the complicated discourse of love in law 
better than Henry Smith. In his assize sermon, Smith explains that when 
judges sit “upon the Bench,” they “should forget themselves to be men, 
which are lead [sic] by the armes betweene favour and feare, and thinke 
themselves Gods, which feare nothing.”33 However, judges should blend 
that “feare nothing” attitude with genuine Christian compassion. When 
common people petition them for protection, judges should respond 
with sympathy not contempt. Smith tells the following story to illus-
trate his point:
When Phillip, the king of Macedonia, did cast of the earnest sute of a poore wid-
owe with this slender answere; go thy way, for I have no leasure to heare thee 
now. She replied thus, and why hast thou leasure to be a King: as if shee should 
have said, God hath given thee time to raigne, and power to govern, that thou 
mightest applie them both unto that end wherefore they are given thee: for mer-
cie and truth preserveth a King, and with loving kindnes his seat is upholden. 
Prov. 2034
There are two details here that are relevant to the present discussion. 
First, the character of the “poor widow” (or her cognate, the poor man 
or orphan) is a stock character in literature of this kind. She represents 
a subordinate subject who is particularly deserving of judicial regard 
30 Qtd. in Adlington, “Restoration, Religion, and Law,” 429. Adlington focuses specifi-
cally on assize sermons from 1660 to 1685, but many of his observations are applicable 
to earlier sermons. According to him, “approximately three- fifths of printed assize ser-
mons were preached on Old Testament texts, with Psalms, Proverbs, and Exodus being 
the favourite sources. Acts, Romans, and Hebrews were the most popular sources of New 
Testament texts” (427).
31 Harris, Saint Paul’s Exercise, D4r.
32 Samuel Ward, Jethro’s Justice of Peace. A Sermon Preached at the Generall Assises Held at 
Bury St Edmunds for the Countie of Suffolke (London, 1621), B[7]r– v.
33 Smith, The Magistrates Scripture, in The Sermons of Maister Henrie Smith, Gathered into 
One Volume. Printed according to His Corrected Copies in His Life Time (London, 1593), Yy8v.
34 Smith, A Memento for Magistrates, F1r.
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because, lacking money and protection, she is vulnerable to social or 
economic oppression. Second, Smith defines kingship and magistracy 
in the language of Christian care. For Smith, the end of kingship is the 
preservation of “mercy and truth.” By refusing to hear the widow’s 
“truth” (in the form of her “earnest suit”), the king of Macedonia dem-
onstrates his inadequacy as a ruler. To Smith’s audiences, the attack on 
Philip would have carried political resonance, for the name “Philip” 
had become synonymous with “tyrant.” Thomas Wilson’s translation 
of Demosthenes’s Philippics (1570) explicitly connected Philip of Mace-
don’s military aggression with that of Philip II of Spain.35 The lesson 
that Smith seeks to impart is that kingship and magistracy do not lie 
in grand performances of “majesty” but rather in small, nearly unseen 
acts of “loving kindnes,” such as those that Philip might have bestowed 
upon the widow.
For these writers, the ability to achieve equitable judgment is depen-
dent on a judge’s ability to strike a sympathetic resonance—an emo-
tional bond—with the people. To practice “right judgemente” and 
“equitye,” judges must first see themselves as “fathers.”36 They have to 
be moved by the people’s plight. The ideal judge makes himself avail-
able to the people (especially the poor) by journeying into their midst 
and by adopting an approachable as opposed to haughty deportment. 
Empathy, patience, and fairness are the moral virtues of good judges. 
Hence, religious and moral writings on magistracy tend to equate moral 
feelings (piety, honesty, care, love) with judicial virtù (power, action, 
ability). This literature posits a link between a judge’s capacity for com-
passionate feeling and his ability to do justice. Real justice does not stem 
from law’s bureaucracy or its force alone but from direct contact: the 
face- to- face encounter between magistrates and petitioners. What has 
love got to do with magistracy? Everything, according to the authors 
examined here.
JUDGES ACC ORDING TO THE JUDGES
Legal professionals employed a different language in their praise of the 
worthy judge. Whereas religious and moral authors emphasized the 
need for familiar contact in judgment, legal professionals argued for 
35 See Alastair J. L. Blanshard and Tracey A. Sowerby, “Thomas Wilson’s Demosthe-
nes and the Politics of Tudor Translation,” International Journal of the Classical Tradition 12 
(2005): 46–80.
36 Yelverton, “Notes of Sermons,” 31r.
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the need to suspend all “passions” in the moment of judgment. Judges 
and lawyers from Sir Edward Coke to Sir Francis Bacon instructed 
judges to maintain a distance from the people. Thus, the theme of loving 
magistracy is largely absent in the professional literature.
Legal professional accounts of magistracy highlight the judges’ intel-
lectual acuity and expansive legal knowledge. On the qualities of the ex-
cellent lawyer, the judge Sir John Dodderidge reflected that the “‘[t]he 
first and chiefest Natural gift is sharpenesse, and dexterity of wit.’”37 
Lesser authorities concurred. The judge and law reporter Sir George 
Croke praised Sir Christopher Wray, his contemporary and a Chief Jus-
tice of the Queen’s Bench, as that “most revered Judge, of profound and 
judicial knowledge.”38
The discussion of the role of legal knowledge in judgment domi-
nated Coke’s reflections on law. Rarely does Coke talk about love and 
friendship in law; instead he emphasizes the challenges (and plea-
sures) of legal study. For Coke, “Judges of the Law” address “mat-
ters of difficultie.”39 On the “jurisprudence” of the medieval judge Sir 
Thomas Littleton, Coke sings of Littleton’s “certaintie and knowledge 
of the Lawe.”40 Justices such as Littleton devoted their lives to honing 
the “art” of legal logic:
He [Littleton] was learned also in that Art, which is so necessary to a compleat 
Lawyer (I mean) Logicke, as you shal perceive by reading of these Institutes, 
wherein are observed his Sillogismes, Inductions, and other arguments; & his 
Definitions, Descriptions, Divisions, Etymologies, Derivations, Significations, & 
the like.41
When professionals such as Coke talk about themselves or their col-
leagues, they invariably mention their “Art,” “wit,” and “knowledge.” 
This mode of thinking about the legal character runs counter to the 
popular one, which discusses it in terms of Christian virtue or love. 
The standards by which Coke evaluates his peers—past, present, and 
future—are what we might call “textual” or “academic.” Coke was 
clearly addicted to the pleasures of reading, and he was proud of his 
37 Dodderidge, qtd. in Paul Raffield, “The Ancient Constitution, Common Law and 
the Idyll of Albion: Law and Lawyers in Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2,” Law and Literature 22 
(2010): 20.
38 Croke, qtd. in G. W. Keeton, Shakespeare’s Legal and Political Background (New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 1967), 6.
39 Edward Coke, Les Reports de Edward Coke (London, 1602), E1r.
40 Coke, The First Part of the Institutes (London, 1628), Ggggg2v– 3r.
41 Ibid., ¶¶v.
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achievements. Sounding not unlike a modern- day university professor, 
Coke instructs his readers to work their way through the complete text 
before resorting to abridgments and commentaries:
Myne advice to the Studient is, That . . . hee read againe and againe our Author 
himselfe [i.e. Littleton] in that Section, and doe his best endeavours, first of him-
selfe, and then by conference with others, (which is the life of Studie) to under-
stand it, and then to read our Commentarie thereupon, and no more at any one 
time, than hee is able with delight to beare away, and after to meditate thereon, 
which is the life of reading.42
To “read againe and againe” and then “meditate thereon” constitute 
Coke’s understanding of the legal method and the essence of legal 
work. Coke is therefore fundamentally interested in the intellectual rea-
soning aspects of law: how lawyers acquire, develop, and ultimately 
perfect what he calls “artificial reason” (lex ratio).43
Despite their political differences, Bacon agreed with Coke (and other 
lawyers) on the nature and practice of judicature.44 Bacon states that “[a] 
popular Judge is a deformed thing: and plaudite’s are fitter for players 
than for magistrates.” While Bacon encourages judges to “[d]o good to 
the people, love them and give them justice,” he warns them against 
courting popularity: “let it be, as the Psalm saith, nihil inde expectantes; 
looking for nothing, neither praise nor profit.”45 Bacon’s statement re-
flects an ongoing concern among Elizabethans with what Jeffrey S. Doty 
calls the “problem of popularity”: that anxious and paranoid suspicion 
42 Ibid., A[2]r.
43 Lex ratio is defined by Coke in the following passage: “Ratio est anima legis; for then 
are we said to know the law, when we apprehend the reason of the law; that is, when we 
bring the reason of the law so to our owne reason, that wee perfectly understand it as our 
owne” (Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England or a Commentary upon 
Littleton [London, 1809], §395a). For further discussion of Coke’s understanding of the 
difference between natural and artificial reason, see Allen D. Boyer, “Sir Edward Coke, 
Ciceronianus: Classical Rhetoric and the Common Law Tradition,” International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law 10.28 (1997): 6; J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century: A Reissue with 
a Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 35; Charles Gray, “Reason, 
Authority, and Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke,” in Culture and Poli-
tics: From Puritanism to the Enlightenment, ed. Perez Zagorin (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1980), 30; and John U. Lewis, “Sir Edward Coke: His Theory of Artificial 
Reason as a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory,” Law Quarterly Review 84 (1968): 337. 
44 On the conflict between Bacon and Coke, see Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nation-
hood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
chap. 2.
45 Bacon, “Speech . . . before the Summer Circuits,” in The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and 
Mor all, 307.
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on the part of the ruling class of public figures who court popular opin-
ion, whether in the legal, political, or religious sphere.46
Closely related to the question of popularity in law is that of friend-
ship in judgment. Sir William Lambarde identified “friendship” as one 
of the contributing factors in judicial corruption in Elizabethan courts. 
Too often, judges, justices of the peace, and “other Commissioners or 
Delegates . . . will dip their owne fingers in the Suits that depend before 
them; and will be seene more like to affectionate Advocates, or Parties, 
than to sincere and indifferent Judges.”47 Writing on this subject (in his 
1607 charge to the grand jury), Coke warns fellow judges of the dan-
gers of friendship in their profession. Coke tells the story of a virtuous 
young Roman who foreswears friendship shortly before he becomes a 
senator. The young man invites his friends and family to a banquet and, 
at the end of the meal, makes the following announcement:
It is true that I purpose as I must, to take my leave of you all, and to be a stranger 
to my dearest friends, and nearest Allies: I must forget all former friendships, 
and my most familiar Acquaintance, I must accompt as greatest stra[n]gers unto 
me; Thus must I depart from you, & yet continue amongst you, for by the love, 
power & authoritie of the Senate, I am appointed to be a Judge, and in the seate 
of Justice, I must forget the remembrance of your former friendships and ac-
quaintance, and onely in the person of a Judge, with respect to keepe my con-
science cleare, must with equitie & uprightnes, justly administer justice unto 
you all.48
For Coke, the “person of a Judge” is one who relinquishes the pleasures 
of friendship to pursue the right but lonely path of judicial impartiality. 
To be a good judge, one must in effect act contrary to the dominant 
customs and rituals surrounding conviviality. Seeking popularity and 
cultivating friendship go hand in hand, but neither should exist in the 
law. To resist temptation, judges must adopt stoic self- reserve perfected 
through devotion to legal study. According to legal professionals, it is 
better for magistrates to stand apart from the people than with them, 
to judge them with cool reason than warm passion. The young Roman 
from Coke’s fable who “forget[s] all former friendships” is held to be an 
example for all judges.
46 Doty, “Measure for Measure and the Problem of Popularity,” English Literary Renais-
sance 42 (2012): 33.
47 Lambarde, Archeion, G1v.
48 Coke, The Lord Coke His Speech and Charge. With a Discoverie of the Abuses and Corrup-
tion of Officers, ed. Robert Pricket (London, 1607), B4r.
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ENTER THE LORD C H IEF JUSTICE:  
SHAKESPEARE’S HENRY IV,  PART 2
The two sections above explored some of the key differences between 
popular and professional discourses on the character of the judge. That 
work allows me to begin to unpack the complex and ambivalent depic-
tion of judges and judgment in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 2. The role 
of the Chief Justice in the play has inspired numerous scholarly reflec-
tions. Some critics have explained the existence of the character and his 
significant role in the play using allegorical or structural analysis. For 
example, C. L. Barber reads the meetings between Falstaff and the Chief 
Justice as an extension of the play’s moral message: Falstaff represents 
Vice and Carnival, and the Chief Justice Virtue and Lent. According to 
that structural logic the Chief Justice must accompany his antagonist 
wherever the latter goes.49 Since Barber’s time, critics have greatly ex-
panded the conversation by taking into account the character’s political 
fortunes, specifically, his role in the contest between royal power and 
the rule of law. In act 5, scene 2, we witness a dramatic encounter of 
conflict and reconciliation between the young king and the Chief Jus-
tice and, ostensibly, the institutions that each character represents. For 
Lorna Hutson, the scene captures the spirit of the play, which celebrates 
“civic consciousness” over royal absolutism.50 Her reading is supported 
by Paul Raffield’s discussion of the Chief Justice as a “model of gover-
nance” who upholds the “ancient constitution” by teaching Hal the les-
son of “accountable kingship and limited monarchy.”51
While these interpretations provide the groundwork for the analysis 
that follows, I am concerned that the criticism to date focuses too nar-
rowly on the character’s speech in that scene. It is important to keep in 
mind that the role of the Chief Justice is both substantial and evolving.52 
49 Barber, “The Trial of Carnival in Part 2,” in William Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 2, ed. 
Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), 21–28. Barber writes that the 
“basic structures” of the play are “shaped by morality- play encounters between Virtues 
and Vices, encounters which from my vantage here can be seen as cognate to the festive 
and scapegoat pattern” (23).
50 Hutson, “Not the King’s Two Bodies: Reading the ‘Body Politic’ in Shakespeare’s 
Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2,” in Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe, ed. Lorna Hutson and 
Victoria Kahn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 167.
51 Raffield, “The Ancient Constitution,” 41.
52 The Chief Justice speaks 149 lines in Henry IV, Part 2. To put that in perspective, 
Henry IV speaks 293 lines, Prince John 108, and Northumberland 108. These numbers 
are based on William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 2, ed. René Weis (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1998). Subsequent quotations will come from this edition and will be cited parentheti-
cally in the text.
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What that means in staging is that the character of the Chief Justice ap-
pears throughout the play; furthermore, his performance once tracked 
exposes fascinating contradictions if we wish to pursue a political read-
ing of the play, one that perceives the play as a celebration of the ability 
of the law to curtail the excesses of royal power, we should try to under-
stand all the actions of the character, actions that turn out to be curi-
ously inconsistent. Sometimes, he embodies the accessible and loving 
form of judgment that is rooted in popular religious literature, yet at 
other times he projects the aloof and “logical” form of judgment found 
in the legal professional literature. This mixture in the Chief Justice’s 
character reveals the active engagement of the play with both popular 
and professional legal literatures.
In the opening of the play, the Chief Justice patrols the streets like a 
constable. Falstaff’s greeting to the justice—“I am glad to see your lord-
ship abroad” (1.2.92)—establishes the signature difference between this 
justice and his textual predecessors. Whereas this judge bumps into Fal-
staff at Pie Corner, Eastcheap, the judges in Shakespeare’s source- texts 
sit in judgment at Westminster.53 In one of the sources, Sir Thomas 
Elyot’s The Governour (1531), the prince “set all in a fury / all chafed, and 
in a terrible maner / came up to the place of judgement” after hearing 
that the “Chief Justice” has refused to release the prince’s playmate. The 
judge bravely sits “styll without movynge / declarynge the majestie of 
the kynges place of judgement.”54 Elyot’s use of antithesis allows the 
reader to compare the prince’s “fury” to the judge’s calm, the former’s 
motion to the latter’s “styll[ness].” Likewise, in The Famous Victories of 
Henry the Fifth (by an anonymous playwright, performed before 1588 
and published in 1598), the judge is bench- bound and flanked by two 
legal officials, a jailer and a clerk. The judge’s opening line, “[j]ailer, 
bring the prisoner to the bar” establishes the actors’ static spatial rela-
tionship.55
In his encounters with the people, the Chief Justice performs the re-
storative possibility of the law. For example, when presented with the 
chance to investigate Falstaff’s part in the robbery at Gad’s Hill, the 
53 Pie Corner lies at the intersection of Giltspur St. and Cock Lane, West Smithfield 
(Weis, Henry IV, Part 2, n. to ll. 26–27).
54 Elyot, The Boke Named the Gouernour (London, 1531), P[7]v– P[8]r. The passage, with 
minor orthographic changes, is transcribed by John Stow in The Annales of England (Lon-
don, 1592).
55 Barbara Hodgdon, ed., The Famous Victories of Henry the Fifth, in The First Part of King 
Henry the Fourth: Texts and Contexts (Boston: Bedford, 1997), 291–308. The line is spoken 
at 4.1.
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Chief Justice decides to overlook Falstaff’s transgression for, in his 
words, the knight has done a “day’s service at Shrewsbury,” which has 
“a little gilded over [his] night’s exploit on Gad’s Hill” (1.2.143–46). The 
justice’s comment reflects a willingness to set aside the strict demands 
of the law in favor of an equitable solution. His decision exemplifies a 
form of equity in which the letter of the law is bent on account of the 
law’s spirit.56
In his scenes with Mistress Quickly, the Chief Justice outdoes the jus-
tices of the peace, Shallow and Silent, in his attentiveness toward her 
affairs. He instantly materializes upon Fang and Mistress Quickly’s 
cries: “A rescue, a rescue!” (Fang) and “Good people, bring a rescue or 
two” (Quickly, 2.1.54–55). Then, without much ado and without sher-
iffs or recorders or jurors, he arbitrates the dispute. He listens to Mis-
tress Quickly’s complaint that Falstaff “hath eaten [her] out of house 
and home” (2.1.72), that is, the sum of “thirty shillings” (2.1.100), and 
he learns that the knight has broken his promise of marriage to make 
Mistress Quickly his “lady . . . wife” (2.1.91)—a contract allegedly wit-
nessed by “goodwife Keech the butcher’s wife” (2.1.92). Before long, the 
Chief Justice decides the case in her favor. He admonishes Falstaff for 
“practis[ing] upon the easy- yielding spirit of this woman, and ma[king] 
her serve your uses both in purse and in person” (2.1.112–14) and orders 
Falstaff to remunerate her: “[p]ay her the debt you owe her, and unpay 
the villainy you have done with her. The one you may do with sterling 
money, and the other with current repentance” (2.1.116–19). His deci-
sion is partly based on his prior knowledge of Falstaff’s “great infamy” 
(1.2.133) and on his understanding of Falstaff’s “manner of wrenching 
the true cause the false way” (2.1.108–9). The Chief Justice’s judicial 
style, as the scene reveals, is personal and intimate. His ears are attuned 
to the complaints of the suffering petitioner (although, it must be said, 
Mistress Quickly stretches the traditional image of the poor widow). 
He does not rely on attorneys and scribes to transcribe or interpret the 
evidence. In short, he acts as “defender of the fatherlesse, poore and 
needy” as prescribed in the religious and moral literature.57 Embody-
ing the archetypal, biblical image of the good judge, the Chief Justice 
addresses the needs of this lowly member of society and gives her a just 
and immediate solution. In an additional flourish, Shakespeare shows 
56 The representation of equity in early modern literature is (inevitably) a vast subject, 
but see Mark Fortier, The Culture of Equity in Early Modern England (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005).
57 Richard Carpenter, The Conscionable Christian (London, 1623), D1r.
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the justice as a sensitive as well as sensible lawman when he tries to pair 
Mistress Quickly with Falstaff, an attempt to provide her with the sym-
bolic reparation she so craves: to be his lady wife.
The reduction of distance between the justice and the people is paral-
leled in the play’s topographical foreshortening. The urban landscape 
of the play, ostensibly the streets and taverns of fifteenth- century Lon-
don, is reduced through a careful limitation of what is represented 
or alluded to in the scenes. In her article on dramatic representations 
of early modern London, Marissa Greenberg observes that certain 
plays in the period (such as domestic tragedies) exploited the public’s 
anxiety concerning urban growth by “rendering London epistemologi-
cally secure” through the naming of London streets, boroughs, docks, 
markets, churches, and other topographical features.58 Henry IV, Part 2 
works its magic in a different way. It achieves a sense of topographical 
familiarity not through an obsessive plotting of the imagined space but 
through the studied deletion of space. Falstaff’s world is so appealing 
because it is dissimilar to the audiences’ actual experience of London 
life. Falstaff’s London belongs to an imagined, bygone world of “olde” 
England, which is distinguished by its sense of physical intimacy and 
closeness.
The accessibility of the Chief Justice is thrown into relief by the legal-
ism of Justice Shallow, who casually squanders his right to arbitrate a 
local dispute.59 To appreciate Shakespeare’s design of the character of 
Justice Shallow, we should briefly examine the Elizabethan literature on 
the subject. Customarily, a justice of the peace was a local administra-
tor of the sovereign’s law. In Shakespeare’s time, a justice of the peace 
was responsible for making inquiries into felony cases, hearing witness 
testimonies, overseeing poor relief, investigating recusancy, regulating 
alehouses and inns—he had many duties. In theory, only those who 
were “wise and learned in the law (‘sages et apris de la leye’)” could be ap-
pointed justices of the peace.60 The “keepers of the Peace” were, ideally, 
58 Greenberg, “Signs of the Crimes: Topography, Murder, and Early Modern Domestic 
Tragedy,” Genre 40 (2007): 4.
59 The total failure of Shallow as a justice of the peace—and how it could be seen to 
reflect the government’s complaints against wayward JPs—is illuminated in Colin Bur-
row, “Reading Tudor Writing Politically: The Case of 2 Henry IV,” Yearbook of English 
Studies 38 (2008): 234–50. See also John Kerrigan, “Henry IV and the Death of Old Double,” 
Essays in Criticism 40 (1990): 24–53.
60 Stat. 18 Edw. III (sess. ii), c. 2, qtd. in J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal His-
tory, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25.
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“[m]en of the beste reputation (Meultz vailantz).”61 Yet in reality, the 
commission was more often than not given to men of local significance: 
men who enjoyed special social and economic status in the commu-
nity. As Cynthia B. Herrup explains, “local standing, not legal expertise, 
qualified men as justices.”62 Thus, it was often the case that landowners 
possessing limited legal knowledge and superficial legal training be-
came justices of the peace. The gap between expectation and reality was 
not lost on legal professionals and other observers. Lambarde was evi-
dently so agitated by the ignorance of his fellow justices that he wrote 
and published an informative, accessible manual for justices. In Eire-
narcha (1581), Lambarde regrets that the “more parte of the Justices of 
the Peace, at this day had nede of some helpe in writing for their better 
conduict in that office” and hopes that his “booke made common by Im-
pression” might indeed “increase the knowledge of many of them and 
consequently doe a common good.”63
Shallow, as his name suggests, epitomizes the figure of the foolish jus-
tice. Yet his real failing does not lie so much in his lack of legal knowl-
edge as in his reliance on hearsay evidence and report. Whereas the 
Chief Justice adjudicates Quickly’s complaint in person, Shallow per-
mits his servant Davy to tell the story. From Davy, Shallow hears of 
a conflict between one “William Visor of Won’cot” and one “Clement 
Perks o’th’Hill” (the nature of the dispute is never made clear).64 Davy 
pleads with Shallow to “countenance” or favor Visor (5.1.33) against 
Perks, even though Davy acknowledges the latter’s respectable reputa-
tion. Initially, Shallow resists, remarking that “Visor is an arrant knave, 
on my knowledge” (5.1.35). But Davy asserts that an “honest man . . . is 
able to speak for himself, when a knave is not . . . I beseech you let him 
be countenanced” (5.1.38–39 and 43–44). Here, Davy juggles two mean-
ings of the word “knave.” Derived from the Old English word cnafa, 
“knave” signified to Shakespeare’s audience both “boy” and “rogue.”65 
61 Lambarde, Eirenarcha (London, 1581), C8v.
62 Herrup, The Common Peace: Participation and the Criminal Law in Seventeenth- Century 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 42.
63 Lambarde, Eirenarcha, Aijv. There was a market for this and other such manu als, for 
Eirenarcha was reprinted sixteen times between 1581 and 1626, and Michael Dal ton’s The 
Countrey Justice (London, 1618), a book modeled after Lambarde’s, enjoyed similar popu-
larity with readers.
64 Burrow explains that “Wo’ncot and the ‘Hill’ are Gloucestershire places, correspond-
ing to Woodmancote and Stinchcombe Hill” (“Reading Tudor Writing Politically,” 243).
65 “Knave, n., 1 and 3,” Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), http://www.oed.com.
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In a linguistic sleight- of- hand, Davy appears to transpose a more inno-
cent meaning of the word (“boy”) for a more insidious one (“rogue”), 
as when he argues that a “knave” (“boy”) is unable to deliver his own 
defense.
The silver- tongued Davy also hoodwinks his master by confusing 
the universal category with the particular. Even if a knave is unable to 
“speak for himself,” it does not follow logically that all knaves lack elo-
quence. But Shallow, as his name implies, is too dull to detect the logical 
fallacy. Finally, Davy wraps his argument in the sweet words of friend-
ship. He tells Shallow that Visor is “mine honest friend” and simulta-
neously reminds his master, “I have served your worship truly . . . this 
eight years” (5.1.40). The evocation of friendship and loyalty proves ir-
resistible to Shallow. Even though “Visor” signifies the “front part of 
a helmet” and a “mask to conceal the face,” meanings which instantly 
connect the character to the play’s recurring scenes of nighttime vio-
lence and military aggression, and “Clement” suggests Christian mercy, 
mildness, kindness, humility, and perhaps wisdom, Shallow abides by 
Davy’s request to favor the former.66 Witnessing the episode from his 
place at the dinner table, Falstaff concludes his host is utterly ruled by 
his servants: “by conversing with them, [he] is turn’d into a justice- like 
servingman” (5.1.59–60). This breakdown in justice, stemming from 
both the JP’s misplaced notion of friendship and his reliance on hearsay, 
is precisely what writers decried in sermons and moral essays.
Justice Shallow represents a flawed magistrate. Yet, his foil, the Chief 
Justice, is also a compromised legal administrator. As the play pro-
gresses, it becomes evident that the Chief Justice’s approach to judg-
ment, which seems equitable, intimate, personal, and perhaps emotion-
ally satisfying, is unsustainable. Instead of establishing order once and 
for all, the Chief Justice allows Falstaff to take advantage of Mistress 
Quickly’s gullible nature a second time. We recall how he had rational-
ized Falstaff’s transgression at Gad’s Hill: “[b]ut since all is well, keep 
it so. Wake not the sleeping wolf” (1.2.149). The line is based on the 
proverb “let sleeping dogs lie.”67 But the replacement of “dogs” with 
66 “Visor, vizor, n.,” OED Online.
67 Compare this line to “[i]t is nought good a slepyng hound to wake” (Geoffrey 
Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd ed. [Bos-
ton: Houghton, 1987], 3.764); “it is evill waking of a sleeping dogge” (John Heywood, The 
Proverbs of John Heywood. Being the “Proverbes” of That Author Printed 1546, ed. Julian Shar-
man [London, 1874], 51); and “[i]t is evill waking of a Dog that doth sleepe” (Nathaniel 
Woodes, The Conflict of Conscience [1581], qtd. in Bartlett Jere Whiting, Proverbs in the 
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“wolf” gives pause. Because “wolf” evokes danger and lawlessness, the 
line subtly conveys the possibility that his decision to delay judgment 
could result in unforeseen and troubling consequences. For what hap-
pens when the wolf awakes? Act two reveals the consequences of the 
Chief Justice’s decision to maintain the status quo. At the precise mo-
ment when he appears to have successfully pressed Falstaff into “sa-
tisfy[ing] the poor woman” (2.1.129), a messenger, Gower, enters bear-
ing a message for the judge. As he becomes immersed in reading the 
latest “news” (the allocation of the king’s troops), the Chief Justice 
misses Falstaff’s new trick: conning Mistress Quickly out of £10, which 
is a greater sum than the original one cited in her suit. At the end of 
the scene, Mistress Quickly, who has, in her words, “borne, and borne, 
and borne, and have been fobbed off, from this day to that day,” is left 
to bear her burdens for another day (2.1.33–34). In short, while full of 
good intentions, the Chief Justice fails to produce tangible results. His 
legal interventions fail to advance the cause of justice in a lasting way.
Thus, a later scene overwrites the logic of an earlier one. Taken 
together, they form a palimpsest. Initially, the familiar contact between 
the Chief Justice and the people fulfills the popular notion that justice 
depends on the absence of legal intermediaries. Unlike Justice Shallow, 
who allows his servant Davy to mediate the dispute between William 
Visor and Clement Perks, the Chief Justice does not rely on hearsay but 
investigates cases in person. During his walk through Eastcheap, he nips 
street violence in the bud and, demonstrating his humanity, he soothes 
Mistress Quickly by acknowledging her right to become Falstaff’s. In 
these early scenes, the Chief Justice is the very image of a loving, public- 
oriented magistrate as posited in the popular literature on judges and 
magistracy. But even as the play invites audiences to commend the 
Chief Justice’s employment of summary judgment, it leaves the audi-
ence in doubt of the practicality of that model. The Chief Justice lacks 
the means to enforce his judgment. He is a tourist in his city.
By leaving the bench and making his way through the city, the Chief 
Justice comes in contact with the commoners, but he also relinquishes 
the ability to correct their transgressions and to enforce the law. Thus, he 
bears more than a passing resemblance to the “old lord of the Council” 
described in Henry IV, Part 1, who “rated” Falstaff “in the street” about 
Earlier English Drama with Illustrations from Contemporary French Plays [Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1938], 154).
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the latter’s pernicious influence over Hal (1.2.83–84).68 (This character 
does not actually appear in the play.) When Falstaff recounts the meet-
ing to Hal, saying how he “marked him not . . . and yet he talked wisely, 
and in the streets, too” (1.2.86–87), Hal compares the “old lord” to Wis-
dom: “[t]hou didst well, for wisdom cries out in the streets and no man 
regards it” (l. 88–89). If the “old lord” symbolizes Wisdom and if the 
Chief Justice is based on the “old lord,” it stands to reason that the audi-
ence is encouraged to associate the Chief Justice with Wisdom. But this 
comparison is potentially problematic, since Wisdom is ignored by the 
people, the “simple ones” and “scorners” of the marketplace:
Wisedome crieth without, shee uttereth her voice in the streets: Shee cryeth in 
the chiefe place of concourse, in the openings of the gates: in the city she utter-
eth her words, saying, How long, ye simple ones, will ye love simplicitie? and 
the scorners delight in their scorning, and fooles hate knowledge?69
Slowly, then, the play exposes the flaws in the popular, “loving” fantasy 
of magistracy. However, its reduction of one fantasy does not amount 
to unambiguous support for another professional or institutional ideal 
of the judge. Just as the play reproduces, yet at the same time under-
mines, the popular discourse, so it does the same with the professional 
one. The Chief Justice’s final scenes demonstrate the paradox of legal 
authority. In order to embody the splendor of the law, the Chief Justice 
has little choice but to sever his relationship with the people, resulting 
in the permanent rupture of the merry world.
In act 5, scene 2, the Chief Justice is summoned to appear before the 
new king at Westminster. The Chief Justice worries that the death of 
the old king leaves him “open to all injuries” (5.2.8). The courtiers con-
cur with his grim assessment. Warwick informs him, “[i]ndeed I think 
the young King loves you not” (5.2.9), and Prince John declares, “[y]ou 
stand in coldest expectation” (5.2.31). Seemingly abandoned by his 
former allies, the Chief Justice, for the first time in the play, emotes fear: 
“O God, I fear all will be overturned” (5.2.19). When he meets the new 
king, he launches into an eloquent defense of his actions and of the ne-
cessity of his office. The speech effectively disassociates the man from 
the office:
I then did use the person of your father.
The image of his power lay then in me;
68 Shakespeare, The First Part of Henry the Fourth, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. 
G. Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton, 1974), 847–85.
69 Prov. 1:20–22, The Holy Bible (London, 1612).
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And in th’administration of his law,
Whiles I was busy for the commonwealth,
Your highness pleasèd to forget my place,
The majesty and power of law and justice,
The image of the King whom I presented,
And struck me in my very seat of judgement.
(5.2.72–79)
In the speech, the Chief Justice tries to extinguish any sense of his own 
agency: he claims that he did not punish the prince for physically assault-
ing him, the private individual, but for attacking the king, the common-
wealth, and the “majesty and power of law and justice” (5.2.77). Not un-
like a conjurer who arranges his charms, tokens, and talismans before 
casting a spell, the Chief Justice enumerates the objects that bespeak his 
authority, such as the “seat of judgement” (5.2.79), the “awe- full bench” 
(5.2.85), and “the sword / That guards the peace and safety of your per-
son” (5.2.86–87). Through such a layering of legal language, he recreates 
the symbolic parts of the law. At the same time, the tactic is evasive, for 
he hides behind the scrim of judicial symbols. In this speech, then, he 
engages in a linguistic act of self- fashioning through self- effacement. In 
order to establish his own authority, the Chief Justice develops a paral-
lel between legal and royal authority. Yet this is potentially problematic, 
for it jeopardizes the independence of the judiciary and endangers the 
very ideal of English “mixed” government.
The appointment (or reappointment) of the Chief Justice promises 
the beginning of a golden age of legal administration in England. Yet as 
the final scenes of the play demonstrate, the administration of justice is 
limited by the Chief Justice’s newfound closeness to the king. The re-
sult of this pact contributes to the breakup of community. After his rec-
onciliation with the king, the Chief Justice assumes a place within the 
king’s council. Where the king goes, so goes he. Consequently, he does 
not witness the beadles’ arrest of Mistress Quickly and Doll Tearsheet. 
He does not see them dragging out the women for a “whipping- cheer” 
(5.4.5)—punishment for their alleged participation in a murder (“the 
man is dead that you and Pistol beat amongst you” [5.4.16–17]). The 
identity of the dead man, the means by which he came to be in Mistress 
Quickly’s house, her motives for “beat[ing]” the man to death—these 
are all left as open- ended questions. Mistress Quickly demands a fair 
hearing—“bring me to a justice” (5.4.25)—but her request is ignored 
by the beadles. The Chief Justice is conspicuously absent, and so too is 
the form of accessible justice he represented. What is Mistress Quickly’s 
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fate? Shakespeare trusts his audience to supply the missing scene. As 
the Middlesex County Records reveal, women (sometimes identified 
as prostitutes and brothel keepers) were whipped for moral transgres-
sions. Joan Lea, for example, was informed that as she had “confessed 
that she had a bastard child begotten on her by Thomas Bates,” she 
would be “openly whipped at a cart’s tail in St. John Street upon Satur-
day next until her body be all bloody.”70 This may be the punishment 
awaiting Mistress Quickly and Doll Tearsheet.
The end of the play sees the establishment of a new order—yet this 
order comes at an emotional cost. Acting as the king’s deputy, the Chief 
Justice plays a role in Hal’s public humiliation of Falstaff. Shakespeare 
has prepared the audience for this scene since Hal’s first soliloquy in 
Henry IV, Part 1: “I know you all, and will a while uphold / The unyok’d 
humor of your idleness” (1.2.195–216). But no amount of foreshadow-
ing can soften the impact of Hal’s final and irreversible rejection of Fal-
staff. Disappointed, chastened, Falstaff faces up to reality by acknowl-
edging to Shallow his debt of a thousand pounds: a stupendous sum as 
befitting a larger- than- life man. The impact of the scene on audiences 
hardly needs to be rehearsed. To quote A. C. Bradley, “we feel . . . during 
the King’s speech, a good deal of pain and some resentment.”71
The rejection of Falstaff is one of the most dramatic and emotion-
ally wrenching moments in Shakespearean drama, and the Chief Justice 
plays a prominent role in this tragic scene. Hal charges the Chief Justice 
to “see performed the tenor of my word” (5.5.70).72 So he does, by order-
ing his officers to “[g]o carry Sir John Falstaff to the Fleet / Take all his 
company along with him” (5.5.89–90). Falstaff beseeches the Chief Jus-
70 “Sessions, 1613: 4 and 6 August,” in County of Middlesex. Calendar to the Sessions 
Records: New Series, Vol. 1: 1612–14, ed. William Le Hardy, British History Online, http://
www.british- history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=82310.
71 Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: Macmillan, 1934), 251.
72 In the Oxford edition, Weis modernizes “tenure” to “tenor.” Although this emen-
dation makes grammatical sense, it flattens the semantic richness contained in the origi-
nal spelling. Both the 1600 quarto editions (see the Qa and Qb copies available on EEBO) 
and the 1623 first folio (see Digital facsimile of the Bodleian First Folio of Shakespeare’s plays, 
Arch. G c.7, http://firstfolio.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/book.html) spell the word “tenure.” Accord-
ing to the OED, the primary meaning of “tenor” is the “course of meaning which holds 
on or continues through something written or spoken; the general sense or meaning of 
a document, speech, etc.; substance, purport, import, effect, drift” (“tenor, n.1 and adj.,” 
OED Online). Yet there is also a legal connotation. “Tenure,” in English common law, sig-
nifies the “name given to the relationship whereby a tenant holds land of a lord” (Baker, 
Introduction, 223). Henry’s use of the word recasts his relationship with the judge as that 
between a lord and his tenant. This language thus works against the civic republicanism 
inherent in the common law discourse, which posits the independence of the judiciary.
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tice for an interview. But the Chief Justice cuts off Falstaff’s pleads (“My 
lord, my lord—”) and defers the conversation with these brief lines: “I 
cannot now speak. I will hear you soon. Take them away” (5.5.92–93). 
The simple sentences seem transparent, yet they jangle with extra sig-
nificance. “I cannot now speak” expresses the Chief Justice’s desire to 
follow the king. But the line also suggests his lack of agency. As the 
king’s counselor and the living “image” of the sovereign, the Chief Jus-
tice must form his words and actions according to the king’s will. “I 
will hear you soon” constitutes the Chief Justice’s promise to listen to 
Falstaff’s rejoinder to the edict of banishment. Yet the line also signals 
the Chief Justice’s participation in the game of deferral and mediation 
that so often leads to the exploitation of the people, as noted by contem-
porary commentators. Finally, his line, “take them away,” foreshadows 
the death of Falstaff and of the joyful world for which he stood. Indeed, 
the sentence presages the quiet erasure of the Chief Justice himself, for 
he, like Falstaff, plays no part in Henry V. His absence hollows out Hal’s 
promise to “stoop and humble my intents / To your well- practised wise 
directions” (5.2.119–20). In Henry V, it is the king and his bishops who 
resolve thorny legal questions such as the historical origins of the “Sa-
lique law” (1.2.54) and the judgment of the traitors Scroop, Grey, and 
Cambridge (1.2.54).73 The removal of the Chief Justice deprives the 
royal court of his “wise directions” and paves the way for the king to 
rule with near- absolute freedom.
C ONCLUSION
Henry IV, Part 2 refracts law into vignettes, each containing a different 
vision of justice. The Chief Justice possesses many of the moral quali-
ties of a good judge as defined by preachers and moral authors: “deepe 
understanding,” “boldnesse and courage,” “honesty of conscience,” 
“uprightnesse of justice,” and “equitie of sentence.”74 But these moral 
qualities do not enable him to implement the law. The Chief Justice 
mingles with the people, yet that personal contact does not lead to the 
people’s lasting happiness. True, the people gain a measure of recog-
nition in the eyes of the law. However, this in itself does not appear to 
accomplish the basic “desire” of justice as defined in the classic maxim: 
73 Shakespeare, The Life of Henry V, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans 
(Boston: Houghton, 1974), 930–75.
74 This list of moral qualities comes from Garey, Ientaculum Iudicum, B3r– v.
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justice means to “render to each one that which is his due.”75 This sen-
tence, from Justinian’s Institutes, alludes to Aristotle’s discussion of jus-
tice as equity, the practice of giving to each person what is due to him 
or her. For Aristotle, the end of justice is the “attainment of . . . hap-
piness” or “‘the good life.’”76 With that value in mind, we might ask, 
do the actions of the Chief Justice produce the conditions for justice 
and the “good life”? It seems not. His judgments are not enforced. He 
leaves the inhabitants of Eastcheap in various states of irresolution and 
even suffering at the end of the play.
Yet the failure of the familiar model of magistracy does not function 
as an endorsement of the professional discourse that views magistracy 
as a performance of majesty and imagines legal distance to be a nec-
essary part of the law. When the Chief Justice acts as a royal justice, 
he becomes an instrument for a kind of poetic injustice, and for that 
breach he appears to be condemned to dramatic oblivion. Thus, the play 
problematizes both institutional and popular visions of the character 
of the judge. What we are left with is a character constructed out of the 
clashing desires and anxieties of multiple communities: common law-
yers, preachers, and satirists—perhaps the audience themselves. Shake-
speare’s legal character both arises from and magnifies conflicting cul-
tural ideologies. A judge should strive to be accessible but not common. 
A judge should be with the people but maintain his distance, for he 
risks subjecting himself to the people’s rule if he is seen to be too acces-
sible. A judge should be loving—but also severe. A judge should listen 
to his “feeling heart”—but control his feelings with reason. What a be-
wildering set of contradictions.
Like its source-texts, Henry IV, Part 2 presents audiences with “a pano-
rama of society,” to quote Jonathan Bate.77 It depicts the interwoven his-
tories of many worlds, elite and common, urban and rural, and develops 
some of the most urgent social, political, and legal questions of the day. 
The play functions as a heuristic, an instrument of investigation, in the 
way it exposes the internal contradictions in commonly held logics 
about the administration of law. To be effective, should a judge strive to 
be removed from the people? Should they privilege legal reason over 
75 Justinian and Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, The Twelve Tables, and the 
CXVIIIth and CXXVIIth Novels, trans. T. Lambert Mears (London, 1882), Just. 1.1.
76 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1926), 1.4.2–3.
77 Bate, Soul of the Age: A Biography of the Mind of William Shakespeare (New York: Ran-
dom, 2009), 296.
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human compassion—what preachers call “love”? The play provides no 
easy answers. In withholding a resolution to a persistent problem and 
in resisting the affective logic of preachers and other moral writers, the 
play breaks free from its popular roots. Yet even as the play seems to 
criticize popular sentiments, it draws audiences toward an unspoken, 
perhaps unspeakable, conclusion: the ascension of law comes at the ex-
pense of true justice.78
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